Children's Sensitivity to Their Own Relative Ignorance: Handling of Possibilities Under Epistemic and Physical Uncertainty

• Elizabeth J. Robinson ^[3] ; Martin G. Rowley ^[1] ; Sarah R. Beck ^[2] ; Dan J. Carroll ^[2] ; Ian A. Apperly ^[2]
  1. [1] Keele University

     Keele University

     Newcastle-under-Lyme District, Reino Unido

     
  2. [2] University of Birmingham

     University of Birmingham

     Reino Unido

     
  3. [3] Warwick University

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• Localización: Child development, ISSN 0009-3920, Vol. 77, Nº. 6, 2006, págs. 1642-1655
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00964.x
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• Resumen

  • Children more frequently specified possibilities correctly when uncertainty resided in the physical world (physical uncertainty) than in their own perspective of ignorance (epistemic uncertainty). In Experiment 1 (N=61), 4- to 6-year-olds marked both doors from which a block might emerge when the outcome was undetermined, but a single door when they knew the block was hidden behind one door. In Experiments 2 (N=30; 5- to 6-year-olds) and 3 (N=80; 5- to 8-year-olds), children placed food in both possible locations when an imaginary pet was yet to occupy one, but in a single location when the pet was already hidden in one. The results have implications for interpretive theory of mind and “curse of knowledge.”