Acceso usuarios
Nadav Klein, Ed O'Brien
People commonly establish in advance the thresholds they use to pass social judgment (e.g., promising reward/punishment after a fixed number of good/bad behaviors). Ten preregistered experiments (N = 5,542) reveal when, why, and how people violate their social judgment thresholds, even after formally establishing them based on having full information about what might unfold. People can be swayed to be both “quicker to judge” (e.g., promising reward/punishment after 3 good/bad behaviors, yet then acting after 2 such behaviors) and “slower to judge” (e.g., promising reward/punishment after 3 good/bad behaviors, yet then withholding until 4 such behaviors)—despite all behaviors obeying their threshold. We document these discrepancies across many parameters. We also propose and test an integrative theoretical framework to explain them, rooted in psychological support: Being both “quicker” and “slower” to judge reflect a shared function of the distinct modes of evaluation involved in the act of setting social judgment thresholds (involving a packed summary judgment extending across myriad possible realities) versus following them in real time (involving an unpacked focus on whatever specific reality unfolds, which could provide higher or lower support than threshold setters had accounted for). Manipulating the degree of psychological support thus determines the direction of threshold violations: Higher support produces “quicker to judge” effects while lower support produces “slower to judge” effects. Finally, although violating one’s preset threshold may sometimes be to one’s benefit, we document initial evidence that it also risks damaging people’s reputations and relationships. When it comes to treating others, making exceptions to the rule may often be the rule—for better or worse. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved)
