Racionalismo modal, naturalismoy escepticismo empirista

• Miranda-Rojas, Rafael ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad Católica del Maule

     Universidad Católica del Maule

     Provincia de Talca, Chile

     
• Localización: Límite: revista de filosofía y psicología, ISSN-e 0718-5065, ISSN 0718-1361, Nº. 15, 2020
• Idioma: español
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Modal rationalism, naturalism and empiricist skepticism
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • español

    Recientemente Machery (2017) ha desarrollado una crítica a la práctica filosófica fundada en casos hipotéticos, el denominado método de casos (method of cases). Una vía para cuestionar esta práctica y el rol de las intuiciones en el mismo es el denominado argumento desde la no confiabilidad (unreliability). De esta no confiabilidad se sigue una conclusión escéptica respecto de los análisis modales característicos de ciertos argumentos filosóficos: la exigencia de suspensión de juicio ante los casos filosóficos. Esta postura conduce a sostener una inmodestia filosófica respecto de los límites epistémicos que no permitirían, por ejemplo, solucionar los desacuerdos perennes presentes en el ámbito filosófico. Ello deriva a su vez en dos consecuencias cuestionables de la argumentación filosófica, según Machery: dogmatismo (dogmatism) o insularidad (parochialism). Mi objetivo en este escrito es analizar qué noción confiabilista está en juego en esta postura experimental negativa (negative Xphi) desde la propuesta desarrollada por Goldman (2013), y evaluar la validez de una postura escéptica empirista, considerando el escepticismo como una postura prima facie especulativa y, por tanto, no contrastable empíricamente. Si lo anterior es correcto, observo que existe un problema en una postura experimental escéptica.

  • English

    Recently, Machery (2017) has developed a critique of philosophical practice based on hypothetical cases, the so-called method of cases. One way to question this practice and the role of intuitions is the so-called argument from unreliability. From this non-reliability a skeptical conclusion follows regarding the modal analyzes characteristic of certain philosophical arguments: the requirement of suspension of judgment concerning philosophical cases. This posit leads to maintain a philosophical immodesty regarding the epistemic limits that would not allow, for example, to solve the perennial disagreements present in the philosophical field. This in turn results in two questionable consequences of philosophical argumentation, according to Machery: dogmatism (dogmatism) and / or parochialism. My objective in this paper is to analyze what reliability notion is at stake in this negative experimental stance (negative Xphi) from the proposal developed by Goldman (2013), and to evaluate the validity of an empiricist skeptical stance, considering skepticism as prima facie speculative and, therefore, not empirically testable. If this is correct, there is a problem in a skeptical experimental position.

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