Real people or mere numbers?: The influence of kill-save ratios and identifiability on moral judgements

• Autores: Rui Costa Lopes, André Mata, Cristina Mendonça
• Localización: International Journal of Social Psychology, Revista de Psicología Social, ISSN-e 1579-3680, ISSN 0213-4748, Vol. 36, Nº 2, 2021, págs. 378-395
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.1080/02134748.2021.1886700
• Títulos paralelos:
  • ¿Personas reales o meros números?: La influencia de la proporción vidas sacrificadas/vidas salvadas y la identificabilidad en los juicios morales
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• Resumen
  • español

    En los dilemas morales, la toma de decisiones puede basarse en un razonamiento más utilitario o deontológico. En dos estudios experimentales, manipulamos el número de personas que han de ser sacrificadas (1 para salvar a 5 vs. a 3 para salvar a 5) y si se presenta información individualizada sobre ellos. Los resultados ofrecen evidencia sobre la supeditación de los efectos de las tasas muertos-supervivientes y la posible identificación de las posibles víctimas entre sí. En particular, esta investigación demuestra que cuando se presenta información individualizada sobre las posibles víctimas en un dilema del tranvía, los participantes son más reticentes a sacrificar tres personas para salvar a otras cinco que a sacrificar a una persona para salvar a cinco. Cuando no se presenta información individualizada sobre las posibles víctimas, la aceptabilidad de sacrificar ciertas personas no depende del número de estas

  • English

    In moral dilemmas, decision-making can be based on more utilitarian or deontological reasoning. In two experimental studies, we manipulated the number of people to be sacrificed (1 to save 5 vs. 3 to save 5) and whether personalizing information about them was presented. Results provide the first evidence of how the effects of kill-save ratios and identifiability of the potential victims are contingent on one another. Specifically, this research shows that when individuating information about the potential victims is present in a trolley dilemma, participants are more reluctant to sacrifice three persons to save five than to sacrifice one person to save five. When such individuating information is not present, the acceptability of sacrificing the victims does not depend on their number.

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