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We investigate the psychological bases underlying moral dilemma judgment with the help of multinomial processing tree modeling, and consider how determinants of dilemma judgment should best be conceptualized. We argue that, for conceptual as well as empirical reasons, norms and consequences should be considered as more intimately linked with one another than their systematic juxtaposition in dilemma research may suggest, and propose that norm-endorsement should be viewed through a consequentialist lens as well. Investigating this proposal, we introduce a variant of the CNI model of moral dilemma judgment, which focuses on the use of proscriptive norms only. In five experiments, we validate this proCNI model and assess the parameters’ sensitivity to different types of consequences and personal involvement. Our findings suggest that the parameter representing “norms” is sensitive to consequences as well, such that norms do not guide moral judgment unless they are expected to produce tangible consequences. Thus, present research suggests that the split between norms and “consequences” (or “deontology” and “utilitarianism”) as determinants of judgment is artificial. We suggest that, ultimately, viewing dilemma judgments through a consequentialist lens may be a useful approach for advancing theoretical development in the field of dilemma research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
