Philosophical remarks concerning upward and downward causation in the realm of the turn to affect.

• Bellomo, Santiago Tomás ^[1]
  1. [1] Universidad de Tarapacá

     Universidad de Tarapacá

     Arica, Chile

     
• Localización: Límite: revista de filosofía y psicología, ISSN-e 0718-5065, ISSN 0718-1361, Vol. 12, Nº. 38, 2017, págs. 39-48
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • Several philosophical research programs developed within the Philosophy of Mind in recent decades have tried to overcome the intellectualist bias that underpinned early findings of the Cognitivist program. In the realm of what has been called the “Turn to Affect”, philosophical developments related to the neuroscientific tradition have emphasized the influence of upward causality, while others, related to the phenomenological tradition have favoured the incidence of downward causality. However, recent discussions have brought to light new conceptualizations that may help to relieve this tension through a renewed understanding of bi-directional causal relations between bodily affects and intentional feelings.

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