Mechanism, explanatory pluralism and efficient coding explanation in neuroscience

• Autores: Sergio Daniel Barberis
• Localización: Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento ( RACC ), ISSN-e 1852-4206, Vol. 9, Nº. 1, 2017 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento), págs. 9-18
• Idioma: inglés
• DOI: 10.32348/1852.4206.v9.n1.14650
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • There is a growing debate within the philosophical community about the unity or disunity of neuroscience. The new Mechanist philosophers claim that neuroscience exhibits a mosaic unity –one in which different explanatory models may contribute to the explanation of some explanandum phenomenon ? by setting causal constraints on the space of possible mechanisms for ?. Non-mechanist philosophers frequently adopt some form or another of explanatory pluralism. In this paper I argue, first, that Mechanism is compatible with a popular version of explanatory pluralism, which I call causally restricted pluralism. Then, I present a liberalized version of explanatory pluralism –one according to which there are models in neuroscience that are explanatory of some phenomenon ? but that do not set any causal constraint on the space of possible mechanisms for ?. Finally, I argue that there is at least one pattern of explanation in neuroscience –namely, efficient coding explanation– that is better accounted for by liberal pluralism.Keywords:Mechanism, Unity of Science, Explanatory Pluralism, Causality, Efficient Coding Explanation.Mecanicismo, Pluralismo Explicativo y Explicación de Codificación Eficiente en Neurociencia. Hay un debate creciente en la comunidad filosófica acerca de la unidad y la diversidad de la explicación en neurociencia. La nueva filosofía mecanicista sostiene que la neurociencia exhibe una unidad de mosaico, según la cual los modelos provenientes de múltiples campos científicos contribuyen a la explicación mecanicista colectiva de un fenómeno explanandum ? mediante el establecimiento de restricciones causales sobre el espacio de mecanismos posibles para ?. Los filósofos no mecanicistas admiten la relevancia (incluso la centralidad) de la investigación mecanicista, pero enfatizan la pluralidad y la diversidad de los programas de explicación en neurociencia. En este artículo argumento, en primer lugar, que el tipo de pluralismo explicativo que muchos filósofos no mecanicistas defienden —lo que llamo el “pluralismo causalmente restringido”— no es una alternativa genuina al mecanicismo. Luego, presento una interpretación liberalizada del pluralismo explicativo, según la cual existen modelos en neurociencia que contribuyen a la explicación colectiva de un fenómeno ? pero que no pretenden establecer restricciones causales sobre el espacio de mecanismos posibles para ?. Finalmente, reseño un programa de explicación en neurociencia, a saber, la explicación de codificación eficiente, que se entiende de manera más adecuada mediante la interpretación liberalizada del pluralismo.Palabras clave: Mecanicismo, Unidad de la Ciencia, Pluralismo Explicativo, Causalidad, Explicación de Codificación Eficiente.

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