La naturaleza del lenguaje: un reto y una propuesta

• Autores: Eduardo Garcia Ramirez
• Localización: Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento ( RACC ), ISSN-e 1852-4206, Vol. 9, Nº. 1, 2017 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento), págs. 54-73
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.32348/1852.4206.v9.n1.12931
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen
  • español

    Prácticamente desde Frege (1892), la tradición filosófica ha dado cuenta de la práctica lingüística a partir de una gramática del lenguaje que determina todos sus contenidos por composición. En este texto me propongo dos metas. Primero, presentaré un nuevo reto a toda teoría del lenguaje. Según este reto es necesario dar cuenta no sólo del uso ordinario del lenguaje, sino también de la adquisición y desarrollo del lenguaje, los cambios que sufren las lenguas a lo largo de su historia y los usos del lenguaje en contextos de ficción. Al presentar este reto quedará en claro que la visión tradicional será incapaz de enfrentarlo a menos que presente una explicación satisfactoria, no ad hoc, de la evidencia empírica que presentaré. De ser así, la tradición habrá encontrado nueva evidencia a su favor. Mi segunda meta consiste en ofrecer una visión alternativa de la naturaleza del lenguaje: la visión abierta. Esta visión da lugar a una nueva teoría capaz de enfrentar el reto exitosamente. Más aún, lo hace a partir de una explicación más simple y con mayor poder predictivo.

  • English

    The compositional nature of language: A challenge and a proposal. Since Frege (1892), the philosophical tradition has made sense of linguistic practice from the point of view of a compositional grammar. In this paper I have two goals in mind. First, I want to present a novel challenge that any theory of language must meet. According to this challenge a satisfactory account of language must not only include ordinary uses of language, but also an account of language acquisition, language development, grammatical changes through history within and across languages, and fictional uses of language. In arguing for this challenge I will make clear that the traditional compositional account is unable to meet the challenge, unless it comes forward with an independently supported empirical account of the problematic evidence. If it can do so, then the traditional account will be in much better shape, with new evidence on its behalf. My second goal consists in sketching a new alternative account of the compositional nature of language (the open view). This view gives place to a new theory, one that can successfully meet the challenge. Furthermore, this new proposal succeeds while presenting a simpler explanation with a greater predictive power.

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