Acceso usuarios
Bernard Gangloff, Luisa Mayoral, Bernard Personnaz
El presente estudio, realizado en Argentina, examina la influencia respectiva de tres criterios (igualdad, equidad y necesidad), a partir de confrontar a 480 empleados (240 hombres y 240 mujeres) a un caso concreto en el que ellos son responsables de aconsejar al encargado de una agencia inmobiliaria respecto de la distribución de una prima entre sus diferentes empleados. Los resultados indican que el reparto de la prima sigue principalmente la regla de equidad, y que, esencialmente, en este caso, cuenta el rendimiento del empleado y su grado de obediencia. Los empleados que obtienen mejores resultados son mejor recompensados que sus compañeros de más bajo desempeño. Asimismo, los empleados rebeldes son penalizados más allá del carácter ético de su rebeldía. No obstante, se observan diferencias de género, siendo éste el punto central de este trabajo. Hombres y mujeres no siguen las mismas reglas para repartir en cuanto a igualdad, equidad y necesidad. Ellos se diferencian también, en la equidad, en cuanto a los criterios que tienen en cuenta (desempeño vs. obediencia/rebeldía) en la decisión de reparto salarial, y finalmente, se observa que la penalización global de la rebeldía está modulada por el género de los participantes.
Done in Argentina, this research confronted 480 salaried employees (240 men and 240 women) to a concrete case in which they had to advise a person in charge of an agency as for the distribution of a bonus between his/her different employees. These last were characterized by their respective performance, one of them being definite as being (or no) financially in the need and as having (or no) complied to a discriminatory hierarchical injunction towards the strangers. The results show that the distribution of the bonus principally follows the equity rules, in which essentially intervene the performance of the salaried employee and his degree of allegiance: the most efficient salaried employees are the most rewarded and the rebel salaried employees are penalized in spite of the ethical character of their rebellion. Otherwise it is to note that the allegiant salaried employees are rewarded in an identical manner, whatever the reason of their allegiance. But it is also noticed frequent differences between men and women, and this fact will be the focus of this work. It is particularly noticed that men and women do not always follow the same rules of distribution equality, fairness and need; they also differ when choosing equity, in terms of the criteria they take into account (performance vs allegiance / rebellion) in their decision to wage distribution, and finally, about the variable allegiance/rebellion, that the penalization observed on a global level vis-à-vis the employee rebel is modulated by gender of participants.
