El Innatismo Moral, un nuevo Paradigma de Desarrollo Moral, aportaciones desde la Cognición y la Neurociencia

• Autores: María Pilar Quiroga Méndez
• Localización: Acción psicológica, ISSN 1578-908X, Vol. 10, Nº. 2, 2013 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Validación de Contenido desde metodologías cualitativas y cuantitativas), págs. 179-188
• Idioma: español
• DOI: 10.5944/ap.10.2.12220
• Títulos paralelos:
  • The Moral Nativism, a new Paradigm of Moral Development, contributions from the Cognition and Neuroscience
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Dialnet Métricas: 4 Citas
• Resumen
  • español

    Este trabajo presenta los nuevos abordajes en desarrollo moral, intuicionismo moral, procesamiento dual, cerebro moral, y universales morales, procedentes de la investigación generada en los últimos años. Durante más de cien años los científicos en general y la psicología en particular, han sido hostiles a la noción de que pueda existir una facultad moral o un sentido de la justicia innato En la actualidad un cuerpo importante de investigación científica procedente de la moderna ciencia cognitiva, está confluyendo en la afirmación del innatismo moral. Hoy existen evidencias suficientes para suponer que las capacidades morales básicas son no aprendidas y universales. Es razonable pensar que una especie tan intensamente social como la nuestra ha creado un modo de favorecer los procesos indispensables para la supervivencia. Por otra parte el procesamiento moral sigue una secuencia que destaca por su automaticidad, lo cuál se refrenda desde la mayor parte de las investigaciones de la psicología cognitiva y desde la neurociencia, creando todo ello un nuevo paradigma de aproximación a la comprensión del desarrollo moral.

  • English

    This paper presents new approaches to moral development, moral intuitionism, dual processing, moral brain, and universal moral; all these topics had been generated from research in recent years. For over a hundred years, scientists in general and psychology in particular have been hostile to the notion that there may be a moral faculty or an innate sense of justice Currently a significant body of scientific research from modern cognitive science, is converging in the affirmation of moral nativism. Today there is sufficient evidence to assume that the basic moral capacities are unlearned and universal. It is reasonable to think that a so intensely social specie like the human being, has created a way to foster the essential social and moral processes for survival. Furthermore moral processing follows a sequence that stands out for its automaticity, which is endorsed from what most of the research from cognitive psychology and from neuroscience, creating a new paradigm to approach to understanding moral development.

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