Laurent Bègue
This paper provides a critical presentation of current theories on moral judgment such as they have been developed, for the main part, through north american or anglo-saxon social psychology. Six principal models and certain tools that are associated with them are analysed successively. These are : The constructivist paradigm (Kohlberg, Gilligan), as well as the controversy of sexual differences in moral judgment, the theories of socialisation, including social learning and the internalization of values (Bandura, Hoffman) , and also the dialectic (Hogan) and taxonomic (Forsyth) approaches. Four broad questions, concerning the often underestimated contribution of the contents and context in moral evaluation are then examined : a) the place for attributory processes, b) the problem of behavioral prediction, c) the sociocultural variations of judgment, and d) the problem, essential in our view, of the strategic and ideological significance of moral positioning. In line with the works of Emler and Doise, we propose to relate the study of moral judgment to the theoretical field of social representations. The question of the role of values in the scientific study of moral judgment is also raised.