Acceso usuarios
Según el modelo de Fernández-Dols (1992, 1994), las personas que perciben que una norma sujeta a sanción es universalmente incumplida son más tolerantes con respecto a comportamientos que implican corrupción así como perciben a las autoridades encargadas de imponer las sanciones como injustas y arbitrarias. 225 participantes (134 conductores y 85 no conductores) contestaron a un cuestionario, donde evaluaban el comportamiento de una persona que perdona cierta multa, estimaban cuál debía ser su cuantía y evaluaban la probabilidad de que se perdonase la multa por poseer alguna característica específica (grado de relación entre transgresor y autoridad). En un caso la multa era con respecto a la transgresión de una norma genéricamente incumplida en España ("llevar el cinturón de seguridad en ciudad"), mientras que los otros dos casos trataban normas cuya transgresión no es obvia o generalizada ("llevar el cinturón de seguridad en carretera" y "conducir con más alcohol en sangre del permitido").
De acuerdo con la predicción, los resultados muestran que los participantes fueron más tolerantes, establecieron una multa menor y consideraron que era más probable escapar a la sanción en el caso de la multa por circular sin cinturón de seguridad en ciudad.
Perverse norms are those formal or informal norms that are universally infringed by a social group, even though they can lead to sanctions (Fernández-Dols, 1992). According to the model of perverse norms, persons who perceive a norm to be almost universally unfulfilled are more tolerant with respect to irregular forms of behavior involving corruption (e.g., systematic transgression of laws or norms for personal gain), and these persons also perceive the authorities who impose the sanctions to be unfair and arbitrary. 225 participants (134 drivers, 85 non-drivers, and 6 no-answer) were presented with a questionnaire with three questions: a) what is your opinion about someone who, having the opportunity, allows a person to escape a fine?; b) what do you consider to be a reasonable fine for such infractions?; and c) to what extent can people in certain groups manage to escape being fined? There were three conditions, depending on the case that the participants had to judge. The case judged by one group concerned a fine due to driving in a built-up area without a seatbelt; a second group judged a case where drivers were fined for driving without a seatbelt on the open road; in the third case the fine was due to driving with more than the legally-permitted alcohol level in the blood. Participants were more tolerant, established a smaller fine, and considered that it was more probable to escape a fine when the fine concerned failure to wear a seatbelt in a built-up area (a norm violated in Spain by the majority of drivers). These results support the hypothesis of a relationship between perverse norms and corruption.
