Acceso usuarios
José Miguel Fernández Dols, Luis Venancio Oceja Fernández
El presente informe analiza empíricamente uno de los efectos más importantes de las normas perversas (Fernández-Dols, 1992): su capacidad para crear una mayor tolerancia a la corrupción entre las personas que la sufren. Para ello se ha llevado a cabo un cuestionario en el que un grupo de 123 sujetos (66 conductores y 57 no conductores) evaluaban el comportamiento de una persona capaz de perdonar, de forma arbitraria, multas de tráfico. En un caso las multas eran con respecto a la transgresión de una norma perversa en España (el límite de velocidad en las carreteras generales) mientras que en el otro caso se trataba de una norma cuya transgresión no es obvia y generalizada (el conducir tras haber ingerido alcohol). Los resultados muestran claramente una mayor tolerancia a la condonación de la multa en el caso del exceso de velocidad, lo que apoya la relación entre corrupción y norma perversa apuntada en nuestra hipótesis.
Perverse norms are those formal or informal norms that are universally infringed by a social group, even though they can result in sanctions (Fernández-Dols, 1992). According to the model of perverse norms, persons who experience a perverse norm are more tolerant with respect to irregular forms of behavior that imply corruption (e.g. the systematic transgression of laws or norms for personal gain). 123 subjects (66 drivers, 57 non-drivers) were presented with a questionnaire in which they had to judge someone who, having the opportunity, allows a person to escape justice, in this case a fine. They had to judge two cases: in one case the fine was due to driving faster than the speed limit (a norm universally violated in Spain); in the other case the fine was due to driving with more than the legally-permitted alcohol level in the blood. Subjects were significantly more tolerant when the fine concerned the speed limit, which supports the hypothesis of a relationship between perverse norms and corruption
