

Why simple lessons from history are recurrently forgotten: The bubble of “epistemic markets”*

Jaan Valsiner**

Clark University (USA)***

Abstract

History of psychology entails knowledge that is relevant for the future of the discipline in two ways: (a) by demonstrating why potentially productive new ideas failed under socio-political conditions in the past, and (b) how such ideas can fit into the solutions for new tasks in the present and in the future. The borrowing of the notion of *epistemic markets* from the domain of economics has highlighted the focus on the first, while a functional history of psychology works for the second. Markets increase—and lose—value of the already existing products, but are not loci of creation of these products. Hence the second direction of inquiry—analysis of the structure of once invented ideas that lost their value on “epistemic markets”—but can provide new impetus for a science that becomes self-averaging—is in order. Otherwise psychology in the 21st century becomes a socially visible and substantively inconsequential part of societies’ self-presentation. The crucial feature of development of ideas—epistemogenesis—occurs prior to their entrance onto the relations of value negotiations of these ideas. History of psychology plays a pivotal role in keeping the epistemogenesis in the focus of contemporary psychologists who would otherwise be seduced by science administrators and their collaborating peers to succumb to the forces of the epistemic market. The market is merely one part of the chain of knowledge construction that proceeds from the atelier or factory of thinking and research to the public display through the constraints of market makers. Markets do not produce—but re-distribute—value. Yet their function is central for future ideas—and history of psychology is the filter through which ideas of the past can be dissociated from, or connected with, the future. Psychology is on the move to renewed focus on general theories of basic human

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** Correspondencia: Department of Psychology, Clark University, Worcester, Ma. 01610, USA. E.mail: <jvalsiner@clarku.edu>.

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psychological issues, and a number of traditions of the past —introspective method for an instance— can be productively resurrected.

Keywords: epistemic market, functions of the history of psychology.

Resumen

La Historia de la Psicología supone un conocimiento relevante para el futuro de la disciplina en dos sentidos; a) demostrando por qué fracasaron ideas potencialmente productivas en el pasado, en determinadas condiciones socio-políticas; y b) cómo pueden encajar estas ideas en las soluciones a las nuevas tareas planteadas en el presente y en el futuro. La noción de *mercados epistémicos*, tomada del ámbito de la economía, ha puesto el acento en la primera, mientras que la historia funcional de la psicología funciona para la segunda. Los mercados aumentan —y hacen disminuir— el valor de los productos existentes, pero no son el lugar donde esos productos se crean. De ahí que sea pertinente la segunda dirección de la investigación y análisis de la estructura de las ideas que, una vez inventadas, pierden su valor en los “mercados epistémicos”, pero que pueden proporcionar nuevo impulso a una ciencia que tiende a adocenarse. De no ser así, la psicología del siglo 21 se convertiría en una parte socialmente visible y fundamentalmente intrascendente del modo en que las sociedades se presentan a sí mismas. El rasgo crucial del desarrollo de las ideas —epistemogénesis— tiene lugar antes de que esas ideas entren en las relaciones de negociación de su propio valor. La Historia de la Psicología desempeña un papel central para mantener la epistemogénesis en el punto de mira de los psicólogos contemporáneos, que de otro modo se dejarían seducir por los gestores de la ciencia y los pares que colaboran con ellos, y sucumbirían a las fuerzas del mercado epistémico. El mercado es simplemente una parte de la cadena de la construcción del conocimiento, que del taller o la fábrica del pensamiento y la investigación sale a la luz pública a través de las limitaciones impuestas por quienes hacen el mercado. Los mercados no producen valor, sino que lo redistribuyen. Y sin embargo la función de los mercados es central para las futuras ideas, y la historia de la psicología es el filtro por el cual las ideas del pasado pueden disociarse del futuro o conectarse con él. La psicología está constantemente renovando su atención hacia las teorías generales sobre las cuestiones psicológicas humanas básicas, y algunas tradiciones del pasado —la del método introspectivo, por ejemplo- pueden ser recuperadas con provecho.

Palabras clave: mercado epistémico, funciones de la historia de la psicología.

Psychology entered 20th century as a promising young science, with new experimental laboratories being established and Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* instigating a new psychological culture. At the start of the 21st century, however, the science of psychology appears in a puzzling state, somehow empty of radically new insights into the human situation.
Steinar Kvale, 2003, pp. 597-598

Has psychology lost its soul? Is it being traded off on an epistemic market as a well-wrapped product under the label of some *-ism*? A brand name of “behaviorism” is as concealing of the ideas as its later dominant substitutes of “cognitivism” or “socio-culturalism”. Or is the soul kept with an epistemic pawnbroker until new values emerge and it is bought back to the realm of everyday craftsmanship? How is psychology creating new knowledge? And what role does the history of the discipline play in such innovation?

METAPHORS WE ACT BY—THE MULTIPLE MAKERS OF A MARKET

Metaphors we use are by and large results of our socially guided fashions. The development of economy is attributed to the functioning of markets—from the farmers’ market in a village to that of stock markets. In the world increasingly dependent on ownership of know-how rather than that of mere means of production of goods (Evers, 2005) it becomes seductive to apply the metaphor of markets to the collective processes that determine the fate of knowledge, or of aesthetic values (Plattner, 1998). The ways of handling knowledge indeed resemble markets, as

There are stringent rules of conduct, but no undue regulation of values or prices; there is competition but no open conflict, and there is a high degree of autonomy in decision-making (Evers, 2005, p. 12)

Historically, the market was one of the three bases for development of a society—the other two being the temple (religious ideology) and the palace (political ideology—Couch, 1986). This tri-part power structure can be seen if we apply the market metaphor to our scientific discourses—behind the seemingly free flow of knowledge between the academics is the iron hand of a ministry of some kind (that administratively regulates what the academics do) and the social organizations of scientists themselves. Yet on the foreground we can see the marketplace of ideas—the epistemic market..

The epistemic market (Rosa, 1994) operates in analogy with the financial market—yet with symbolic¹ rather than financial currency values:


1. Rosa (personal communication, April, 21, 2009) created the notion of epistemic market by analogy with Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of ‘symbolic market’—“...that he relates to symbolic capital, symbolic violence, etc., something he takes to be a real market and not a metaphor.” The market notion in Bourdieu is used as a playground for the *habitus*—as a specific structured place where people interact. The nature of such interaction is dependent upon different kinds of capital—cultural, symbolic, economic—which actors try to maintain, or gain (Goke-Pariola, 1993). Construction of power relations takes place on these markets.

Value in the epistemic market is the relevance and truth *attributed* to the epistemic product. But this is not a question of all or nothing, nor is it an inherent property of an utterance, it is the result of an attribution of value in *reference to an intention* and it is also dependent on the style of reasoning used... A non-negotiable part of the truth value of an epistemic product in the market depends on the *social authority attributed to its producer*, to the “credit” given to his/her products. Certainly epistemic products receive an *attribution of truth when they have an empirical or pragmatic validation*, when they are capable of generating replicable experiences in people different of those who produced them, or when they generate desirable results for consumers. (Rosa, 1994, p. 157, added emphases)

As we can see—epistemic markets, like any other, are a form of theatrical value construction where the rhetoric devices used may lead to increase or decrease of the attributed truth value. The inherent value in the “product”—its fit with the phenomena (see Branco and Valsiner, 1997, on the methodology cycle)—is only a miniscule starting point for entrance onto the market (as they are “generating replicable experiences in people different of those who produced them”). Once on the market, the social construction of the value—through attributions—takes over.

A particular common sense idea (e.g., “evolutionary psychology”, “heuristic”, “bias”, “emotional intelligence”, etc) can become attributed “true” status because of the authority of the producers (e.g., Nobel laureates making trivial comments on social issues far outside of their scientific expertise—but gaining the value on the market). Socially normative use of methods (e.g. statistical data analyses) may be attributed the “truth value” on the basis of conforming with the norms—even if the particular ways of such conforming make no sense for understanding of the phenomena, and may be erroneous from the substantive side of the given norm system.² Such violations can be rhetorically overridden by the pragmatic value of the given product for the consumers—if they buy it (e.g., books on “emotional intelligence” or on “how to make friends”) then these products must have truth value. Finally, the “desirability” of results is determined by social institutions that may enforce a “stop in trading” on an epistemic market for socio-political reasons³ or by way of changes in the fashions in the attribution of “truth” (see Figure 1). Topics (“culture”), methodological perspectives (“introspection”) and concrete concepts (zone of proximal development—ZPD) have had dramatic movements in their attributed values on the epistemic market of psychology over decades.

2. The best example is psychology’s blatant misuse of statistical inference—much to the horror of statisticians themselves who call for purity of the use of their methods (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008).
3. Eradication of psychology in the Soviet Union in 1936.

Figure 1. Fluctuations on the epistemic markets

WORKING BACKWARDS—FROM EPISTEMIC MARKETS TO EPISTEMOGENESIS

Clearly the metaphor of markets as applied to the handling of knowledge in psychology (or any other area of knowledge in our globalizing “knowledge society”) capture only one aspect of knowledge—its fate after it has been produced. The *epistemogenesis*—the birth of new knowledge—happens *prior* to the knowledge product enters the epistemic market. Sure, the conceivers of such new knowledge in the intimacy of their minds are making it under the influence of the current “market forces”—yet their act of creation is to antedate the market, rather than follow it. If it were to follow the market, we would get the dominance of the knowledge (or Thomas Kuhn’s “normal science”) that is characterized by the loss of the heterotopic domain—its in-between status between the known and the not-yet-known. Epistemogenesis is like a boat sailing to unknown destinations—rather than a barge making its daily routine trip between well-known tourists spots⁴ some of which have higher ratings than others in some tourist guide. The tourist can decide which value s/he prefers—while the explorer has no idea of the value of the destination one is about to reach. A navigator may encounter a land after a long ocean journey—deeply believing to have

4. As Michel Foucault has put it poetically—“...for civilization, from the sixteenth century up to our time, the ship has been at the same time not only the greatest instrument of economic development... but the greatest reservoir of imagination. The sailing vessels are heterotopias par excellence. **In civilizations without ships the dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police that of corsairs**” (Foucault, 1998, p.185, my emphasis).

found the ultimate source of all treasures of India. Yet the subsequent history shows that the “market value” of that dream equals that of a hamburger. The value may emerge in the exploration process—or fail to do so.

History of psychology demonstrates to us how the expeditions to explore new territories of the human mind—first faint efforts to study the unconscious, the imageless, or the observable (behavior)—turn into the colonization of mindscapes, charting out protectorates under the control of one or another company (“behaviorism”, “cognitivism” etc.), and begin trading on the epistemic markets. These companies may employ their armies to fight one another—as on the pages of many books on history of psychology we can read of combat narratives of how “progressive” new trend successfully fought (and won) the fight with an “outdated” one. The market is a battleground—not of ideas, but of their uniformed presentations. The “winners” often take over from the “losers” (i.e., the “winning” forces of “cognitivism” maintained the “behaviorist” credo while denying any link with it),⁵ selective appearance on the markets of long-forgotten “giants” whole value is being enhanced in the course of trading⁶ is a major part of the game. The locations where the battlefields—or markets—exist may move from immediate (clashes of varied “fan clubs” at scientific conferences) to the semi-privacy of the research labs (“*our cognitive approach is of course better than their behavioral one*”). This parallels the change in the form of economic markets from the trading floor to the computer screen (Knorr Cetina, 2005). Last—but not least—a market can “blow the bubble”—or be captivated by a social power—trading on a market can be stopped by an administrative command. Markets—even “free” ones—are subservient to political powers.

LIFE BEYOND THE MARKET: CHURCH AND FACTORY.

We now live in the lost hopes of the economic markets that seem to have broken down—after their “bubble”. So it may be the time to remind ourselves that for psychology the market metaphor is but one that fits the history of the field. There have been others—those of *church* and *factory* (Kvale, 2003) have been used most appropriately. Our contemporary production line of psychology’s empirical results seems to resemble that of mass production of cheap brands of goods—with the assumption that the

5. As a test case—consider the “cognitivist” credo of using the term *cognitions* (plural) rather than *thoughts* in order to avoid the subjectivism of the “loser” (to the “behaviorist conquest”)—that of “introspectionism”.
6. Consider Vincent van Gogh—who would have never imagined the mega-prices paid for his *Sunflowers* decades later, the re-emerging high value of the ideas of Vygotsky, Bakhtin, or Levinas in our contemporary social sciences would have been surprising to these modest thinkers.

quality of these goods will be valued as these are taken to the market. Yet science is to find new solutions, new explanations—and the image of a mass production lines is antithetical to that goal.

From the perspective of epistemogenesis, it is the studio (*atelier*) metaphor of an artist that may fit better than those of market, factory, or church. Psychologist trying to create new science is like an artist changing the prevailing—marketable—style of painting into something scandalous, not yet experienced, and misfitting with the common-sense reality. Picasso’s decision to depict a female model in a cubist way was far out of the market value of his time—quite differently from now. Epistemic markets *follow*—not lead—the epistemogenetic processes—**as the markets are incapable of novelty construction**. Markets select—for consumption—and then manipulate the value of what is selected by letting these results to be traded. Before a farmer—or a psychologist—takes one’s product to the market, that product has to be cultivated.

THE SECRET OF SELECTION—SYMBOLIC VALUE RE-DISTRIBUTION

Free markets are not free. Their self-proliferating propaganda of “we are free” is a mask to hide the constrained and constructed nature of the value. The “initial public offering” of an idea on the epistemic market is a carefully scripted social power game.—similarly to that of IPOs on the stock market. In the “regular trading” on markets it is the value arrived at—through small-scale trading— before the actual opening hours that sets the stage for the dynamics of a stock for the given day. When the market opens some of the market makers have collectively set up the new starting price for the given stock. From that moment onwards, the value might fluctuate by the dynamic supply/demand processes, but the “head start” for it is given before. For example—the external to psychology technological invention—fMRI technique— may be seen as giving such “head start” for some sub-area of psychology. Yet any new technologies—no matter how highly valued by markets—do not generate new knowledge unless there is an idea for which their use is relevant. An affluent research center may afford a fMRI machine—and be in need to keep it working—yet how can it find minds who make that machine work beyond repeating the ideas of the past⁷ is the critical question for a science.

Social institutional—thus extra-scientific—interests are the “market makers” on the epistemic markets. Consider the development in most countries of the world over the last decade of academic evaluation systems based on the symbolic “peer review”

7. Many of the fMRI uses are set to answer questions that were asked in the 19th century phrenology— what function is localized where?—only now inside the brain, rather than on the cranium.

status of journals, and—even more prominently—of a particular journal’s “impact factor” for the evaluation of individual academics and/or research groups.⁸ Such administrative interference into the epistemic markets is changing the nature of what kinds of “products” are to be “traded” at initially highly set “prices.” The impact of such market-making would be devastating for the discipline in the long run—we see proliferation of small fragmented “pieces” of knowledge, high redundancy between these, and a focus on publishing for the sake of publication—not communication with other scientists. Suggesting the valuation of quantitative approaches (“evidence based ,medicine”) over their qualitative counterparts sets the epistemic markets up to artificially demand presentation of knowledge in accordance with social norms rather than methodological fit (Branco & Valsiner, 1997). The development of psychology since the 1930s has been shown to see such “market guidance” that involves alienation of the data from the phenomena from which they are derived (Cairns, 1986; Toomela, 2007).

HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY AS LOW-VALUED PRODUCT—OR A PRE-MARKET VALUE MAKER

How does history writing in psychology operate in such market making process. The usual role histories of science are given by the makers of the epistemic markets is that of a “junk bond”—it is given a place on the market, but its value is declared to be that of next to nothing. Science finds its history a story of errors—that undermines the “bright spots” of events declared to be “breakthroughs”. The latter segregate the history of a science from its present and future state—history of the discipline is mostly that of *wrong* ideas, or of past right solutions—**in either case it is disconnected** from what happens in the science now.

However, when we see history of science as a reservoir of ideas—tried but for varied reasons abandoned—we can see the role of such history as a pre-market value maker. Since many of the abandoned ideas were left behind not because they did not work, but for reasons of change in the dominant ideologies, or simply premature death of the inventors of the ideas. A return to have a careful look at their potentials is what gives history of science a powerful role in the making of the future—and it can take on the role of a pre-market value maker. Yet for such change history of science needs

8. Such reversal of valuation—on the basis of the outcome (publication in place X rather than Y) it is the value of the process that is being created—allows for social control by institutions. The pragmatist stance—value created by utility (social opinion encoded in outcome evaluation) supports administrative control here. The use of journals’ “impact factors” to evaluate authors’ “impact” in the field has been proven to be unwarranted (Simons, 2008; Valsiner, 2009b).

to become self-reflexive—what kind of knowledge about history has what kinds of function in the current development of the discipline? Some kind of knowledge blocks the possibility to innovate science, other—may enable it. For example—the usual way of dividing the discourse in history of psychology into the narrative of “opposing camps” (“mentalism” versus “behaviorism” versus “cognitivism” versus “socio-culturalism”) guarantees that none of these —isms—as they get much attention in the story telling about psychology’s history, would have any function in the innovation of psychology at the present time. These are epics of the past—carefully segregated from the present—yet not forgotten. Just the opposite—one can claim that knowledge of these “schools” is very valuable (like in any society the myths of one’s folklore are held in esteem). This is the knowledge of no functional relevance—by public exposure to it the very knowledge is rendered useless. We know—maybe even feel we know very well—and pass by.

STRATEGIES OF IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT FORGETTING—AND SELECTIVE RESURRECTION

We can discern a number of strategies of value construction—some of which are disconnected from feeding into the future of the discipline, others—do it in direct or indirect ways.

The strategy of **categorical organization and segregation** (CAS—described above) guarantees functional ignoring of the ideas of the past through active acquisition of historical knowledge of the past. We get to know—in order not to know. For example—the often re-told story of how the Cultural-Historical School (Vygotsky and Luria) became victims to the Stalinist transformations in the Soviet society provide us with a kind of “martyr role” given to the scientists who went through these days, but is useless as to further development of the ideas of either Vygotsky or Luria.

A similar result in blocking the use of the old ideas in our time is achieved by the strategy of **disciplinary re-classification** (DRC). Somebody whose work initially was seen that of category X becomes—in post-factum writing of history of the discipline—a very well honored representative of category Y. Thus, Franz Brentano’s contributions to psychology in parallel with these of Wilhelm Wundt⁹ have in the subsequent century become re-classified into philosophy—and hence that “famous philosopher” is segregated out of psychology’s current *foci* of interest. George Herbert Mead—who was a physiological psychologist turned into a social psychologist—became re-classified in

9. Both Wundt and Brentano provided their definitive starting points for psychology in parallel in their books published in 1874.

his own institution from being a psychologist to being a philosopher—and re-enters into psychology in the second half of the 20th century via sociology. Alexius Meinong and his colleagues at Graz working on basic thinking processes were—like Brentano—segregated to philosophy. Hans Driesch's philosophical interests in psychology were left in biology. These moves to “behind the boundary” can be explained by the differentiation of the disciplines involved towards separating themselves from philosophy.

The DRC also works in the opposite direction—bringing historical ideas from behind an artificial frontier into psychology. Thus, our current fascination with Mikhail Bakhtin overlooks the belonging of his basic ideas to literary scholarship and philosophy, Ilya Prigogine's physical chemistry (which borrowed from the philosophy of Henri Bergson and through him—from James Mark Baldwin) becomes fitted into psychology as a new umbrella of “chaos theory.”

There are more drastic strategies—such as **symbolic power cleaning** (SPC). SPC entails eradication of a particular tradition from the history of the discipline by social power assertions. The 1936 decree against paedology in USSR was an act of SPC—resulting in eradication of the name and replacement of the term by “psychology” in re-publishing paedological texts.¹⁰ Pavlov's penalties to his lab workers when caught using “mentalist language” amount to SPC as well.

Then, there is the process of **natural decay** (ND)—the traditions of a given kind are slowly moving to their oblivion, with historians of psychology idly looking on. The disappearance of the traditions of *Ganzheitspsychologie* from the public view of psychology in Germany and elsewhere after World War II can be seen as a case of ND (Diriwächter and Valsiner, 2008).

Finally, there is the strategy of **selective maintaining** (SM)—a way of writing an account of history of the discipline that highlights some part of the past for linkages with the present—while keeping other parts of the whole away from that highlighting. Jacob Moreno's *psychodrama*—the basis for his sociometry (Moreno, 1947)—has been forgotten in the study of social networks¹¹—while his *sociometric techniques* that were the outcome of the psychodrama emphasis have been maintained as “the root” for contemporary social networks studies (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass and Labianca, 2009). A similar example can be found in the selective maintenance of Lev Vygotsky's ideas—from his *cultural-historical* perspective our contemporary *socio-cultural* followers of Vygotsky take the role of the “social other”—social environment, “more knowledgeable” peer or parent/teacher of the child, and hail Vygotsky for focusing on the primacy of the social in the ontogenetic process. In that glorification, Vygotsky's focus on hierarchical order

10. For example, all references to paedology in Vygotsky's 1934 Russian edition of *Thinking and Speech* were changed to “psychology”.

11. For a full history of the Moreno tradition, see Freeman, 2004.

(“higher” and “lower” psychological functions) are left in the periphery of the coverage,¹² and the focus on the individual play and fantasy barely mentioned at all.¹³

WHY THE MARKET IDEA IS NOT SUFFICIENT

It is a relief that the post-modernist empiricism—masking itself in philosophically sophisticated formulations—is on its way to loss of value on the “epistemic market” of contemporary social sciences (Valsiner, 2009a). Knowledge—precisely because of its context-dependency—is general in its nature. Without a possibility for generalization the discursive practices of any social science are of no knowledge value. Generalization of a scientific idea—tested on the epistemic market—is subsequently withdrawn from that market to be a tool usable in further epistemogenesis. The epistemic market **is merely a part in the chain**—and even not an obligatory part¹⁴—**of knowledge construction processes**, rather than the sole determiner of the value of scientific production. Markets only re-distribute value—by the actions of consumers of knowledge who pretend to be producers.

Pretend play is crucial in human development—we pretend to be what we are not (yet), act as if we were—and end up being different. Yet pretense can also remain a non-constructive game—a form of entertainment. We pretend that yet one more discovered statistically significant ANOVA or linear regression result may solve the problems. The data are created as linear representations—by factory rules—of the phenomena that can be safely assumed to be non-linear in nature. Yet our “market demands” require the pretend play of linearity to proceed with no consideration for the phenomena. A self-entertaining discipline stops being a *Wissenschaft* (Valsiner, 2009a). To avoid that fate—a scientist’s pretend actions need constant correction by the direct relation with the phenomena—through intuitive understanding where to look for solutions (Branco & Valsiner, 1997) as well as efforts of intervention in the phenomena to test the pre-set assumptions. This is especially relevant if the scientist operates with a well-developed

12. As our contemporary social sciences block the notion of “non-democratic”, i.e. hierarchical orders.

13. The central tenet of ZPD (“zone of proximal development”) for Vygotsky is child’s play (and later—adolescent’s imagination)—within which the child raises above the present level of development. That individual core of ZPD is not mentioned when researchers look at the “effects” of the teaching/learning in the context with “more experienced others”. Yet it is the child—alone or in social surroundings—who develops.

14. For example, Gregor Mendel’s knowledge construction proceeded—and succeeded—without any value construction on the epistemic markets during his lifetime. Historical unearthing of his ideas did put them onto the market—where they survived—but long after they were created.

standpoint of some kind, rather than accepts the complexity of the world (Bastos & Rabinovich, 2009). Science is an adventure—not a tourist trip.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Development of a science is a *bricolage*—innovation happens in ways that assemble its elements from varied sources—social demands, available technologies, personal experiences of the scientists, availability—or lack of—research literature, occasional meetings with scientists from other fields, and other myriad of features that cannot be controlled or predicted. That multitude of features of constructing the given discipline's future may—but need not automatically—include borrowing from the history of the given discipline, or of the sciences as a whole.

What would be the forward-oriented role of history of psychology as a tool for development of the discipline? It is a tool of reflexivity—focused on the past, but oriented to the future. A careful analysis of a theme important in the past—yet abandoned by the epistemic markets due to their fluctuations—is to inform the future re-construction of the discipline. For example—at our present time we face the need for re-constructing the introspective method as the core of human psychological research methodology. Having been eradicated from the epistemic markets of psychology under the attack of ideologies (the “behaviorist avalanche”), limits of the method itself (how to deal with the “imageless thought”) and social macro-processes (World War I and its corresponding re-focusing of the social sciences on socially massive phenomena—crowds in revolutions and wars, evaluation of persons within “mass ornaments” of armies, job candidates, or employees, etc), the method is currently on its way back. We can observe that in the increasing use of focus groups, narrative techniques, new focus on the individual case (Molenaar, 2007; Salvatore et al, 2009, Valsiner, 1986). A careful investigation into the history of the introspective method—of its rise and fall—would contribute constructively to the future development of the once-promising but now stagnant intellectual growth in psychology.

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